Lookism:
The Silent Discrimination

By

Allison T. Farrell

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillmet:t
of the requirements of the
University Honors Program
University of South Florida, St. Petersburg

May 3, 2007

Thesis Director: Delaney J. Kirk, Ph.D., SPHR
Professor of Management, Drake University
Visiting Professor, University of South Florida-St. Petersburg
Thesis Committee Member: Nicole Forbes Stowell, J.D., M.B.A.
Visiting Instructor of Business Law, University of South Florida-St. Petersburg

L

University Honors Program
University of South Florida
St. Petersburg, Florida

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

Honors Thesis

This is to certify that the Honors Thesis of

Allison Farrell
has been approved by the Examining Committee
on April 17, 2007
as satisfying the thesis requirement
ofthe University H?nors Program
Examining Committee:

v!4a~c:fl/(~

Thesis Director: Delaney J. Kirk, Ph.D., SPHR
Professor of Management, Drake University
Visiting Professor of Management, University of South Florida-St. Petersburg

Thesis Commit\~ Membe~\ Nicole Forbes Stowell, J.D., M.B.A.
Visiting Instructor of Business Law, University of South Florida-St. Petersburg

_L
....~-

Table of Contents
Introduction ........... .................................................................................................. 1
Chapter 1 Appearance Discrimination ....................................................... ...... ...... . 2
• What is it? .................................................................................................... 2
• What is included? .. ......................... ....... ....................... ..... .......................... 2
• How does appearance discrimination affect people? .................................. 4
• Why does it exist? .................. ..................................................................... 5
• How does it compare to other types of discrimination? .......... .................... 6
Chapter 2 Due Process Clause ................................................................................ 9
• What is the Due Process Clause? ................................................................ 9
• Kelley v. Johnson ........................................................................................ 9
• Claudette Tardif v. Thomas Quinn ............................................................ 11
• Grazyna Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, NY .......................................... 12
• What links these cases together? ........................................................... .... 13
Chapter 3 The Americans with Disabilities Act
& the Vocational Rehabilitation Act. ........................................................ 15
• What are the Americans with Disabilities Act
& the Vocational Rehabilitation Act? ......................................... .............. 15
• Bonnie Cook v. Rhode Island Department
of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals ................. ..... ......... ............. 16
• Toni Linda Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc ......................... ................ 19
• Paul Talanda v. KFC National Management Company .............. .............. 21
• What links these cases together? ............. ...... .............................. .............. 23
Chapter 4 Title VII ............... ................................................................................. 24
• What is Title VII? ..... ....... ....... ....................................... ......... ............ ...... . 24
• Mary M. Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings
& Loan Association of Chicago .............. .................................................. 25
• Darlene Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Company, Inc ......................... . 27
• Price Waterhouse v. Ann Hopkins ....................... ..................................... 29
• Elysa Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc........................................................ 30
• Leslie Frank, et al. v. United Airlines Inc ................................................. 32
• Deborah Marks v. National Communications Association, Inc ................ 33
• Langston Bradley v. PizzaCo ofNebraska, Inc.. ....... ...... ......................... 36
• Wandra McManus v. MCI Communications Corporation ........................ 37
• EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car LLC .......................................... ....... ........... 39
• Brenda Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28 .......................................... 41
• Sheldon Swartzentruber v. Gunite Corporation ...................... ....... .. ......... 42
• James Craig, et al. v. County of Los Angeles ................... .. ...................... 43
• What links these cases together? .......... ................................................. .... 45

Chapter 5 State & Local Laws ............. ................................................................. 48
• Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act .................................. ................ 48
• Barbara Ann Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation ............ 49
• Vincent Byrnes v. Frito-Lay, Inc .............................................................. 51
• The District of Columbia Human Rights Act.. .......................................... 52
• Atlantic Richfield Co. v. District of Columbia
Commission on Human Rights .... ............................................................. 53
• Patricia Underwood v. Archer Management Services, Inc ....................... 55
• Santa Ctuz, CA Human Rights Ordinance ................................................ 56
• What links these laws and cases together? ................................................ 56
Chapter 6 Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications ................................................ 59
• What is a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification? .................................... 59
• Playboy Clubs International, Inc. v.
Hotel & Restaurant Employees &
Bartenders International Union ................................................................. 60
• Savino Latuga, et al. v. Hooters, Inc. ........................................................ 62
• Gregory Wilson, et al. v. Southwest Airlines Company ........................... 63
• Eduardo Gonzalez, et al. v. Abercrombie & Fitch .................... ................ 65
• Kimberly M. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp ..................................... 66
• What links these cases together? ...................... ......................................... 68
Chapter 7 The Future of Appearance Discrimination ........................................ ... 70
• Arguments against legislation ...................... ...... ....................................... 70
• Arguments for legislation .......................................................................... 71
• Where legislation is headed ....................................................................... 73
Bibliography .................................... ...... ................................................................ 76

11

Lookism:
The Silent Discrimination
Introduction
Federal laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, state that
employers cannot discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, age,
religion, disability, or military experience.

But what about discrimination based on

appearance? Can an employer legally choose to hire, fire, promote, demote, or make any
other decision about a potential or current employee based on the way he or she looks?
In many cases, the answer is yes. An employer can discriminate against a person based

on appearance because there are no federal laws and very few state laws that prohibit an
employer from making decisions based solely on an employee's or potential employee's
height, weight or general appearance. Some employees or potential employees have
attempted to sue their employers by linking appearance discrimination t<? other types of
discrimination, but records show that employers have the law, or lack of law, on their
side.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons laws are needed to protect
applicants and employees from appearance discrimination. I will do this by discussing
what appearance discrimination is, cases dealing with appearance discrimination, and the
possible creation of laws preventing this type of discrimination.

1

Chapter 1
Appearance Discrimination
What is it?

According to the Employment Law Alliance, one of the growing forms of
discrimination in the workplace is appearance discrimination. It can affect both current
and potential employees in many different industries.

Appearance discrimination, or

"lookism" as it is sometimes called, involves judging a person by their physical
appearance. This includes physical features as well as style, grooming habits, weight,
and any other external characteristics. These traits are often rated according to whether
they are positive (making a person more attractive) or negative (making a person more
unattractive). Victims are treated differently based on their positive or negative rating.
In most cases, people who are believed to be more attractive are given special treatment

while people who are unattractive may be denied opportunities (Cresap & Tietje, 31 ).

What is included?

If your employer does not like the way you are dressed, the way you do your hair,
or even what kind of jewelry you wear, in most cases, they are allowed to say so.
Looking good on the job can be very important. This is especially true in businesses
where employees have direct interaction with customers. Dress codes come in handy in
these circumstances. Most restaurants require that their employees wear uniforms. For
example, Outback Steakhouse requires employees to wear black plants and shoes,
colorful shirts, and an apron. Tattoos and facial piercings must be covered up. Hair
styles shouldn't be too over-the-top. Also, most retail stores require a certain type of
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clothing be worn. Target, for example, requires employees to wear red shirts and khaki
pants. Dress codes may also be sex speCific. In professional settings, men usually have
to wear a suit and tie while women must wear their skirt below the knee. Employees who
don't follow these rules may be reprimanded or even fired. Even businesses that don't
have a set dress code can refuse to hire someone because of the way they are dressed.
Overall attractiveness can also be a factor when deciding whether or not to hire
someone. As I said before, attractiveness is associated with other positive characteristics.
For this reason, many employers take into account how good-looking a person is before
they hire them. An interviewer may decide not to hire someone before the interview even
begins just because they don 't think they are attractive enough. In fact, some employers
in Europe are now requiring that applicants attach a photo to their application (Millar).
Potential employees might not even make it to an interview before they are turned down
for the job.
Body type is one of the most controversial areas in which employers may judge
the appearance of employees. This is because factors such as weight or height may be
covered under the Americans with Disabilities Act. In the past, overweight people have
been turned down for a job simply because of their size (McDonald). Some applicants
and employees have sued based on the fact that their body type was considered a
disability. Some cases are decided in favor of the employee, but many times weight is
not considered a disability.
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How does appearance discrimination affect people?

According to a study by Drs. Jeff Biddle and Daniel Hamermesh, attractive
people are paid more than unattractive people, on average. The study was conducted by
asking questions about income, occupations, and backgrounds. The interviewers were
also asked to rate the attractiveness of the people they were interviewing based on a five
point scale. After analyzing the results, Biddle and Hamermesh found that the nine
percent of men who were rated "homely" or "below average" received nine percent less
in hourly earnings than those who were rated "average." The eight percent of women
who were rated "homely" or "below average" received five percent less in hourly
earnings than those who were rated "average." The 32 percent of men who were rated
"above average" or "handsome" received five percent more in hourly earnings than those
who were rated "average." The women in these same categories received four percent
more in hourly earnings than those who were rated "average" (Lesley).
Another study by David Blanchflower reported similar findings in teenagers,
based on weight and height. The heaviest ten percent of sixteen-year-old girls received
almost seven and a half percent less in hourly earnings than the other 90 percent. For
teenaged boys, height and not weight was the issue. For every four inches taller a boy
was, he received a two percent increase in pay (Lesley). An article by Jennifer Laabs in
Personnel Journal suggests that one of the effects of appearance discrimination is low

self-esteem. This is especially true of young adults and teenagers. When their first taste
of the working world is soured by discrimination, they may never get over that feeling.
Their low self-esteem may stay with them for their entire lives and result in low
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performance on the job and in life in general. The results of Blanchflower's study make
this a real possibility for teenagers today.

Why does it exist?

The results of these two studies make it easy to see that appearance discrimination
does exist and how it can affect people. But what they don 't explain is why it exists. The
first and most basic reason for its existence is what we blame many other social issues
on-society itself. Our culture teaches us that looks matter and there is evidence that
most people in the United States find the same characteristics attractive (Zakrkewski).
Females are considered more attractive if they have large eyes, a small nose, full lips, a
small chin, and a delicate jaw line. Males are considered more attractive if they have
small eyes, a broad forehead, thick eyebrows, thin lips, and a large jaw. Most members
of American society agree that these characteristics are what make individuals more
attractive (Franzoi).
Typically, people with these attractive characteristics are on television, in movies,
and on the covers of magazines. Because so many elements in society encourage beauty,
it may be said that it's almost instinctive to judge people based on whether they are
perceived to be attractive or not. Because the first thing people notice about a person is
their outward appearance, we often judge people in the first few seconds of meeting them
or even seeing them (Adamitis). Therefore, an employer may use appearance as their
first measurement of employability.
Another reason for the existence of appearance discrimination is that some people
associate good looks with characteristics such as high IQ and success. They believe that
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"beauty signals health, both physical and mental" and "ugliness .. ..signals disease"
(Cresap & Tietje, 38). Since attractive people know how to take care of themselves
physically, they should be able to take care of themselves mentally as well. They are
perceived to have higher levels of intelligence and be able to handle themselves better in
professional settings. They may also be able to make bigger sales and motivate other
employees (Fowler-Hermes). Although this is a widely accepted reason for the existence
of appearance discrimination, there is no evidence proving that it is correct.
One of the strongest motives for the existence of appearance discrimination is that
there are almost no laws preventing it. With the exception of a few areas in the U.S. such
as Washington DC, Santa Cruz, and the State of Michigan, there are no laws that
specifically prohibit appearance discrimination in employment. In addition, over half of
the employers surveyed by the Employment Law Alliance's "America at Work" survey,
stated that they have no policy in place that forbids this kind of discrimination
("Appearance-based Discrimination"). Without the law to guide them or a policy of their
own, employers are free to make employment decisions based on appearance. Even if an
employee tries to sue, they have a difficult time proving that the employer broke the law
when there are no laws to break. As a result, unless the employee is a protected group
member, they can be judged by the way they are dressed, their overall attractiveness, and
sometimes by their body type.

How does it compare to other types of discrimination?

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and other federal laws that prevent_

6

~

discrimination went into effect as a result of past unfair treatment of applicants and
employees by their employers.

The federal government created these laws to end

discrimination in the workplace. It seems logical that the federal government would do
the same to end appearance discrimination.

But there are differences between

disctimination based on race, color, national origin, gender, age or religion and
discrimination based on appearance.
Unlike the types of illegal discrimination, appearance discrimination is subjective.
It is based on personal tastes and preferences, making it hard to document and prove.

Even though most members of American society agree that certain characteristics make a
person more attractive, not ALL people find these characteristics attractive. What may
be aesthetically pleasing to one person may not be pleasing to another person. Therefore,
it would be hard for an employee to sue their employer for discrimination based on
appearance because there's no way to prove that the employer didn't think the employee
was attractive.
Also unlike most types of illegal discrimination, appearance may be considered a
bona fide occupational qualification, or a BFOQ (Zakrzewski). This means that in some
circumstances, an attractive or pleasing appearance may be a requirement of the job.
This is not true for discrimination based on race. Race may never be a BFOQ. Religion
may be considered a BFOQ when hiring employees in a religious organization or "when
membership in a certain religion is reasonably necessary to the performance of a job"
("Bona Fide Occupational Qualification"). Gender may be considered a BFOQ only
when it is absolutely necessary that the employee be a certain sex. The occasions when
gender is not considered a BFOQ include assumptions about a specific gender in general,
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gender stereotypes, and the preference for one gender over another. Age may never be a
BFOQ unless it has to do with the fundamental nature of the job or when safety is
involved. I will talk more about BFOQs in a later chapter.
Because appearance discrimination is not illegal in most places and may be
considered a BFOQ in some circumstances, employees or potential employees are forced
to live with the fact that their employer has discriminated against them. This is true
unless they can connect the discrimination with another type of illegal discrimination. In
the next few chapters, I will discuss how some employees have tried to fight back against
their employers.
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Chapter 2
Due Process Clause
What is the Due Process Clause?

When employers set dress codes and other appearance requirements, they are
discriminating against their employees because they are demanding that they look a
certain way. In most cases, employees understand that these policies exist for safety
reasons, to distinguish them as employees of the business, or to look professional to the
public. But some employees refuse to follow the regulations that have been set and a few
have tried to dispute these regulations.

Because there are no laws stating that an

employer cannot set appearance standards, employees often tum to the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law" (Baron). In some cases, the right to liberty may mean not requiring a person to look
a cetiain way.

Kelley v. Johnson

In 1976, an officer in Suffolk County, NY, contested the police department's
regulation of hair and facial hair. The policy stated that hair must be a certain style and
length. Sideburns and mustaches must also conform to certain standards, and beards and
goatees were not allowed. Except for medical conditions that affected hair growth, these
standards had to be followed exactly (Kelley v. Johnson).

Johnson claimed that

according to the Fourteenth Amendment, his rights were being violated (Baron). He felt
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that by requiring him to be clean shaven, the police department was limiting the liberty
that was afforded to him by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The District Court asked that the Deputy Commissioner of the Suffolk County
Police Department to prove that there was a "genuine public need" for the regulation
(Baron). The Commissioner claimed that these grooming standards were based on the
need to have all police officers look similar for two reasons. The first was to simply
build camaraderie among the officers and the second was to make officers more
recognizable to the public. This was not good enough for the District Court who claimed
that a simple uniform would have satisfied both of the Commissioner's reasons. The
District Court ·found that the regulation did limit the liberty of the officer.
However, when the case hit the Supreme Court, the ruling was reversed. The
Court held that the officer's first duty was to protect the public as a member of the police
force. The force that he belonged to had certain requirements they could demand of their
officers which included wearing the assigned uniform and following all dress code
policies. Therefore, the question was not whether the Commissioner could prove there
was a genuine public need, but whether the officer could establish that the policy was so
illogical that it deprived him of his liberty. The court decided that the need for the
regulation was greater than the individual officer's need to have a beard.
In trying to regulate the appearance of the officers, the Police Department was

discriminating against those who had beards or whose hair did not fit the standard.
Because there was no law against this kind of discrimination, the Police Department was
free to set any policies regarding the appearance of the officers. The officer in this case
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tried to use the Due Process Clause to fight the regulation because no other laws existed.
However, it did not work out in his favor.

Claudette Tardif v. Thomas Quinn

In that same year, Claudette Tardif was fired from the high school where she
taught French for three years. A school official claimed that among other reasons,
Tardifs skirts were distracting to the students and provided them with an unhealthy
learning environment (Baron). The teacher claimed that by requiring that she wear a
certain type of clothing, the school was restricting the liberty that was given to her by the
Due Process Clause. The trial court did not find a problem with the teacher's appearance
and found her skirts to be "comparable in style to dresses worn by young, respectable
professional women" (Tardif v. Quinn). But the court could not decide whether the
school had the right to fire her. Even though her skirts may have been an acceptable
length according to the court, ifher employer did not approve of her appearance, was that
grounds for being fired?
The First Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the school claiming that
Tardifs appearance was more than just her individual choice in this situation. Based on
the ruling in the Kelley case, the court found that an employer has a right to require their
employees to dress a certain way. Because Tardif could not prove that the policy was so
illogical that it deprived her of her liberty, the school had the right to regulate her
clothing. The Court claimed that if the school official felt the teacher was dressing
inappropriately, his right to fire her was greater than her right to wear short skirts. The
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invasion of her liberty was not so unreasonable that it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The teacher in this case was a victim of discrimination based on appearance.
While the school's dress code was probably not unreasonable, the fact that she was fired
for the way she dressed constituted appearance disctimination. Just like in Kelley v.
Johnson, the teacher in this case had to tum to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because there was no law protecting her from appearance discrimination.

Grazyna Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, New York

In 2002, a county van driver for "Meals on Wheels" in Sullivan County, NY,
brought suit against her employer after she was transferred to a different position in the
county because of her appearance. Three years earlier, the county adopted a new policy
requiring that van drivers wear pants as part of their uniform.

Van drivers were

responsible for loading and unloading elderly passengers, many of whom needed the
wheelchair lift to get into the van. For safety reasons, drivers were required to wear
pants. Zalewska, who "as a matter of familial and cultural custom ... [had] never worn
pants in her entire life" refused to abide by the new dress code and continued to wear
skirts to work (Zalewska v. County of Sullivan). Her supervisor told her that she was
required to wear pants if she wanted to keep her job as a van driver. When she still
refused to wear the proper uniform, she was transferred to another department where she
was permitted to wear skirts and even received the same pay.
When Zalewska filed suit, she claimed that by requiring her to wear pants, her
employer was discriminating against her appearance. She felt that according to the Due
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Process Clause, she was being robbed of her right to wear skirts at work. Like both the
Kelley and Tardif cases, the court had to decide whether Zalewska's right to wear a skirt
was greater than her employer's right to create dress code policies. According to the
court, the policy had to be rational and not impose a burden on employees. The county
claimed that they made the dress code change to prevent van drivers from injuring
themselves. While operating the wheelchair lift, it was possible for a skirt to get caught
in the lift mechanism and severely injure the person. Because Zalewska was not abiding
by the dress code, she was at risk for injury.
The District Court found that her right to wear a skirt was not as great as the
county's right to keep their employees safe (Zalewska). While it may have been a case of
appearance discrimination, the employer still had the right to transfer Zaleska for not
following the dress code because there was no law preventing this kind of discrimination.

What links these cases together?

In all three of the above cases, the employees felt that they were victims of

appearance discrimination. Their employers had implemented dress codes requirements
or grooming standards that each employee did not obey. After filing suit under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, all three employees claimed that their
employer had restricted their rights by instituting these policies. They were forced to use
this clause because no other law prevented their employers from discriminating against
them because of their appearance. In all three cases, the courts ruled in favor of the
employer.

The employee's rights to "life, liberty [and] property" did not include
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appearance in these cases because the standards that were set were not considered
unreasonable.

14
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Chapter 3
The Americans with Disabilities Act
& the Vocational Rehabilitation Act
What are the Americans with Disabilities Act & the Vocational Rehabilitation Act?

The Rehabilitation Act was enacted in 1973 and covers companies with federal
contracts or sub-contracts.

The Act was designed to prevent employers from

discriminating against applicants and employees with disabilities. The Americans with
Disabilities Act, or the ADA, was enacted in 1990 and modeled the Rehabilitation Act.
According to the ADA, a person is considered to have a disability if they have either a
physical or mental impairment that limits at least one major life activity ("Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990"). According to the ADA, employers may not fire or refuse
to hire a person with a disability if they can perform the job with or without a reasonable
accommodation.

This can include purchasing customized equipment, providing a

modified work schedule or anything else that does not inflict an undue hardship on the
business or employer.
Determining whether or not someone is covered by the ADA is done on a case by
case basis but can include physical disabilities such as cerebral palsy, acquired
disabilities such as AIDS, mental disabilities, and personality disorders. The ADA even
protects alcoholics and former drug users. Current drug users and transsexuals have tried
to use the ADA to sue their employers for discrimination but none have been successful
yet. With no laws to directly protect employees from appearance-related issues such as
obesity and disfigurement, these issues may be argued under the ADA.
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In recent years, there are a growing number of people claiming to have been

discriminated against because of obesity.

Many have brought charges against their

employers under the ADA. They claim that since obesity may limit a person's ability to
walk or even breathe easily, it is a disability and should be covered under the ADA.
Although obesity was not originally accepted as a type of disability, more and more
courts are allowing obese people the opportunity to prove that their obesity is a disability.

Bonnie Cook v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and
Hospitals

In 1993, a judge awarded $100,000 to a woman named Bonnie Cook who claimed
that she was discriminated against based on a disability. Cook, who had worked for the
Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals (MHRH) until
1986, reapplied for the same position of institutional attendant in 1988. Her duties
included bathing and dressing patients, administering treatment, and serving meals
throughout the day. After receiving a physical exam from a nurse that was employed by
the same company, she was told that she was considered morbidly obese, weighing 320
pounds and being only 5'2" tall. However, she was also told that she didn't have any
limitations that prevented her from working. The MHRH refused tp hire her because of
her morbid obesity saying that she would not be able to evacuate patients of the mental
hospital in case of an emergency. They also claimed that her morbid obesity made her
more likely to get ill which could lead to absenteeism. They offered to hire her if she lost
weight (Cook v. Rhode Island Department ofMental Health, Retardation and Hospitals).
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Because the hospital receives federal funding, Cook sued her former employer
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. But the MHRH claimed that morbid obesity was
not a handicap. In these kinds of discrimination cases, the plaintiff must prove each
component of the Act which includes applying for a job in a federally funded place of
business, being qualified for the job, having a disability, and not being hired because of
that disability. The fact that Cook had applied for a job in a federally funded company
was not debatable, but she had to prove the other three parts.
She argued that she was qualified to do the job for three reasons. First, she had
already shown that she could perform the required job functions when she had the
position two years earlier. Second, the position didn't require much mobility or require
that she be a certain body type. Third, because she had been told by MHRH's nurse that
she didn't have any limitations preventing her from working, she was physically qualified
to do the job.
The next component in disability discrimination cases is to prove that the plaintiff
has a disability. This means that at least one major life activity is limited. But in this
case, it didn't matter whether or not Cook had a disability as long as she was perceived as
having a disability. According to the Rehabilitation Act, even those who are perceived as
having a disability are protected from discrimination. MHRH treated Cook as though she
had a disability when one of their reasons for not hiring her was that ·she wouldn't be able
to evacuate patients because ofher limited mobility. They also believed that absenteeism
would be a result of her obesity if she were to develop health problems. Even though
Cook didn't have any health problems despite her weight, MHRH assumed that she
would.
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The last component was to prove that there was no reason for not hiring the
plaintiff except for the fact that she had a disability. Because MHRH had not given any
reason other than those that related to Cook's weight, it was concluded that she was not
hired because of her perceived disability.
MHRH fired back saying that Cook's morbid obesity should not be considered a
disability and therefore was not grounds to sue. They argued that it should not be
considered a disability because morbid obesity could be reversed and was voluntary. But
because her obesity was caused by a dysfunctional metabolism, even if she lost weight,
the dysfunction would still be present. This means that the cause of the obesity could not
be reversed. Also, according to the Rehabilitation Act, voluntary disabilities are still
considered disabilities.

For example, alcoholism is caused by voluntarily consuming

alcohol but is still considered a disability. The MHRH's arguments were considered
irrelevant anyway because even if she didn't have a disability, she was perceived as
having one.
This case is one of the first discrimination cases dealing with weight as a

It fits into the category of appearance

disability in which the employee won.

discrimination because it was based on the fact that regardless of whether or not Bonnie
Cook actually had a disability, she was perceived as having a disability. But when an
employer refuses to hire someone based simply on the fact that they are obese, rather than
because they perceive them as being disabled, they may not be covered under the ADA.
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Toni Linda Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc.

1n the same year that the Cook case was being argued, the Supreme Court of
California had a very similar case. Toni Linda Cassista, a woman weighing 305 pounds
and standing 5'4" tall, sued Community Foods Inc. after applying for and being rej ected
from four different positions with the health food store. She claimed that because her
weight was the reason she was not hired, she had the right to sue based on disability
discrimination.
She originally applied for one of three positions with the store in 1987. Dming
the interview process she was asked if she had any limitations that would prevent her
from doing the work needed. She told the manager, Will Hildeburn that she did not. She
didn't get any of the positions but reapplied a few weeks later when she heard there was
another position available. After not hearing back from Hildeburn, she called and was
told that the position went to someone else. Upset at not being hired again, she asked
Hildeburn why she didn't get any of the positions. He told her that members of the hiring
committee were concerned with her weight and her ability to perform any physical
activity that the position required such as carrying and stocking large boxes (Cassista v.
Community Foods, Inc).
Cassista requested a meeting with the hiring committee to discuss their criteria for
hi1ing employees. At the meeting, two members of the committee admitted to being
concerned with her weight and how much physical work she would be able to handle.
One stated that she used to be heavier and would go home with pain in her feet and lower
back from trying to perform the necessary functions of the job. The other told Cassista
"that when she was pregnant it became more difficult to climb ladders and stock aisles,
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and observed that physical attributes have to be a part of the decision-making process"
(Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc).
After the meeting with the committee, Cassista decided to sue Community Foods
for disctimination based on her weight. She was offered a job soon after but turned it
down and refused to drop the lawsuit. During trial, Will Hildebum admitted that he was
concerned with Cassista's weight at first but did not feel that it was a deciding factor in
his selection. The two women that commented on Cassista's weight during the meeting
denied making the comments and also claimed that her weight had nothing to do with
their decision not to hire her. Community Foods also insisted that her weight was not a
disability and therefore Cassista had no right to sue.
Cassista claimed that although she had no disability and considered herself to be a
healthy person despite her weight, Will Hildebum and the hiring committee of
Community Foods perceived her as disabled because of her weight. As we already saw
in Bonnie Cook's case, discrimination based on a perceived disability is still considered
discrimination. In that case, MHRH refused to hire her because they thought she might
have limited mobility or other health problems as a result of her weight. However, unlike
Bonnie Cook's case, Will Hildebum and the hiring committee did not believe Cassista
had a disability.

They admitted to being concerned with her weight in regard to

appearance, but did not believe that she had a disability. Because Cassista could not
prove that the committee perceived her as being disabled and had no protection from the
discrimination based on appearance, she lost her case.
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paul Talanda v. KFC National Management Company

Appearance discrimination cases relating to disabilities have not all been
concerned with weight. A case in Illinois in 1998 regarded a manager who was fired
after he refused to follow orders that included removing an employee from the front
counter because she was missing teeth. After working for KFC for nearly 15 years, Paul
Talanda became a store manager of a KFC in Illinois in 1993. In September, he hired
Dorothy Bellson to work at the front counter. Although she was missing some teeth, she
had an outgoing personality and also had experience working with customers. But
Talanda's supervisor, Joanne Overly, was not happy with Bellson's appearance and
requested that Talanda move her to a cook position where she would not be seen by
customers.

Talanda told Overly that he didn't think Belson's missing teeth was a

problem but would "work around it" (Talanda v. KFC National Management Co.).
Overly believed that he meant he would follow her orders, but Talanda did not move
Bellson to a different position.

After repeated requests, Talanda agreed to follow

Overly's orders in a phone conversation that he secretly taped. But for the next few
weeks, Talanda still did not move Bellson to a position out of the sight of customers. He
felt that by forcing Bellson to take a new position because of her appearance was
"morally and legally wrong." He thought that he would be discriminating against her
because of her "facial disfigurement." But instead of voicing his concern to anyone, he
simply refused to follow orders (Talanda v. KFC National Management Co.).
Overly learned from Bellson about the taped phone conversation and she
explained that Talanda was pressuring her to file a lawsuit. Bellson also told Overly that
she was feeling uncomfortable about the situation and didn't want to be involved. After
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learning about Talanda's actions, John Malloy, Director of Human Resources for the
area, decided to fire Talanda for insubordination. Before firing him, Overly and Malloy
met with Talanda and gave him a chance to explain his reasons for not moving Bellson.
When he didn' t give a reason for not following orders, they fired him.
Because there were no appearance-related discrimination laws, Talanda filed suit
against KFC for retaliatory discharge under the ADA. He claimed that Bellson's missing
teeth was considered a facial disfigurement and was therefore covered under the ADA.
Because he refused to move her to another position and was fired for not doing so, he
believed he had the right to sue. But the court did not agree.
To be covered under the ADA, Talanda would have to prove that Bellson was
considered disabled, that she was discriminated against because of her disability, and that
he refused to move her because he thought it was illegal. As we saw in the Cook and
Cassista cases, for a person to be considered disabled, they have to have an impairment
that limits a major life activity. The court claimed that Bellson's missing teeth did not
limit any major life activities. In some cases, this case for example, the defendant may
claim that "working" is considered a major life activity. Talanda alleged that Bellson's
right to work was taken away because of her disability. But the court stated that since
Overly was not asking Talanda to fire her but to simply move her to a different position,
her right to work was not limited. After deciding that Bellson was not disabled according
to the ADA, there was no way to prove that she was discriminated against because of a
disability. The court also stated that because Talanda had failed to mention that his
refusal to move Bellson was due to his belief that Overly's request was discriminatory,
his actions were not covered under the ADA.
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What links these cases together?

These three cases deal with employees who felt they were the victims of
appearance discrimination based on disability. With no laws protecting them, they were
forced to sue their employers under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. They then had to
demonstrate that they were discriminated against because a disability affected their
appearance. In the Cook and Cassista cases, both women felt that they were victims of
appearance discrimination based on their weight. Bonnie Cook won her case because she
could prove that her employer associated her weight with a disability.

Because the

discrimination in Toni Cassista's case was not related to any disability but was only
based on her appearance, she lost her case. Paul Talanda also lost his case because
Dorothy Bell son 's missing teeth were not considered a disability. If there had been a law
protecting employees from appearance discrimination, Cassista and Talanda may have
been able to win their cases.
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Chapter 4
Title VII
What is Title VII?

Title VII is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The act prohibits discrimination
in employment based on race, gender, national origin, color, or religion.

Like the

Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII prevents employers from firing or refusing to
hire someone based on their protected group status.

Employers must also make

reasonable accommodations for these protected group members. For example, this can
include allowing employees to have certain religious holidays off. However, employers
are not expected to make reasonable accommodations if it causes an undue hardship or
the policy is a business necessity.
For employees or applicants to win a Title VII case, they must show evidence that
discrimination occurred or meet the requirements of a prima facie case.

These

requirements include establishing that the applicant or employee is a member of a
protected class, he or she applied and was qualified for the job, he or she was rejected for
the.position, and the employer continued searching for someone to fill the position. Then
the employer must present a non-discriminatory reason for not hiring the applicant or
firing the employee, such as poor performance. If the employer can justify his reason for
firing or not hiring the person, the employee has the ultimate burden of proof in
establishing that discrimination took place.
Title VII may be used in appearance discrimination cases when the discrimination
can be linked to race, gender, national origin, color, or religion. Most of these cases deal
with gender issues. There is a history of cases in which women have felt that they were

24

held to a different set of standards in terms of appearance. This includes having to wear
different uniforms, having to weigh less, and even having to fit society's standards of
beauty.

GENDER

Mary M. Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan Association of Chicago
In 1979, Mary Carroll sued her employer, Talman Federal Savings and Loan

Association of Chicago, for gender discrimination based on appearance. She did so after
being required to wear a uniform that only female members of the staff were required to
wear. The company allowed males to wear any suit, as long as they wore a shirt and tie.
But female members of the staff were required to wear a uniform that was supplied by the
company and consisted of a skirt or slacks and either a jacket, tunic, or vest. Although it
came in a variety of pieces, all items of clothing were color coordinated and gave the
impression of a uniform.
The female staff members were unhappy with their uniforms for three reasons.
The first was based on equity-the male staff members did not have to wear a uniform.
When asked why females had to wear uniforms, an attorney for Talman Federal stated
that the company felt it was,
"a matter of taste, a matter of what the other women are wearing, what fashion is
currently ... women who have excellent business judgment [otherwise] somehow
follow the fashion, and the slit-skirt fashion is currently prevalent. ... They tend to
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follow those (fashions) and they don't seem to equate that with a matter of
business judgment" (Carroll vs. Talman Federal).
The company admitted that they did not feel that women had good judgment when it
came to choosing proper clothing. The company also stated that because females had
more choices to make (for example, skirt, dress or slacks, heels or boots, jacket or
sweater) they had a better chance of looking indistinguishable from customers. Whereas
males looked more consistent because they only had the freedom to choose between
different colors of suits, shirts, and ties.
Second, was the cost of the uniforms. Although they were not required to pay for
the first uniform, it was treated as income in that the company withheld income tax on the
amount of the uniform. If they wanted more pieces or needed to replace a piece of the
uniform, they were required to pay for it themselves. They were also required to have
their uniforms professionally cleaned once a month at their own expense.
Third, was that they felt the uniforms made them look less professional than the
men.

Carroll and the other female staff members felt that society looked down on

employees who wore uniforms rather than regular business attire. Because the women
were the only ones being forced to wear uniforms, it appeared that the men were more
professional than the women.
The company claimed that in order for this case to be considered gender
discrimination, some kind of hardship had to be present. They argued that since the
females were not being denied any opportunities and the uniforms were not distasteful,
this was not considered gender discrimination. But the court did not agree. It's not
illegal to require males and females to abide by different sets of standards as long as it's
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equally burdensome. But because the company openly admitted that the reason for the
uniforms was that females could not be trusted to choose proper business attire, they were
making unfair accusations about females. These females won their appearance-based
discrimination case because it could be tied to a Title VII issue. But as we will see with
this next case, Title VII does not always protect females from appearance discrimination.

Darlene Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Company, Inc.

Darlene Jespersen worked as a bartender at Harrah's Casino in Nevada for 20
years until August 2000. She left after refusing to follow Harrah's "personal best" policy
that had been introduced to employees earlier that year.

The policy required all

employees to maintain a certain appearance. Males and females were required to be
"well groomed, appealing to the eye, [and] be firm and body toned" (Jespersen vs.
Harrah's). They also had to wear a uniform that included a white shirt, black pants, a
black vest and a black bow tie. Males were not allowed to have long hair or wear make
up and had to have clean fingernails.

Females had to wear their hair down, wear

fingernail polish, and wear make-up at all times while working.

This included

foundation, blush, mascara, and lipstick. Jespersen claimed that she had never worn
make up, in or out of work, because it made her feel uncomfortable. When she tried to
wear make-up to work, she said that she was so self conscious and uncomfortable that it
hindered her ability to do her job. After refusing to wear make up, Jespersen was
terminated.

In 2001 , she sued Harrah's for gender discrimination alleging that the "personal
best" policy placed an unequal burden on females and required them to conform to
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gender-related stereotypes. Jespersen's first duty was to establish that the policy was
unequally burdensome to females at Harrah 's. She argued that the existence of the policy
itself was enough proof. She also stated that the time and money it took to buy and apply
make up made it a greater burden than anything that was required of the males. But the
court stated that since Jespersen did not submit any documents that contained proof of the
cost or time it took to put on make up, she could not use that as evidence to support her
claim. Also, although the policy required females to wear make up and prohibited males
from wearing make up, it also required that males keep their hair short but females could
keep their hair long. The policy was not considered an unequal burden to either gender.
As far as her claim that Harrah's was requiring her to conform to gender related
stereotypes, because the policy did not single out Jespersen but pertained to all females
working as bartenders in the casino, it was not seen as discrimination.
The court found that since the policy did not place an unequal burden on either
sex and was not singling Jespersen out, the policy was acceptable. This case turned out
differently than the Carroll case because both males and females had certain requirements
they had to abide by. Neither sex was being treated unfairly or being held to a higher
standard. Their uniforms were the same and both males and females were expected to be
well groomed. Although the specific details of what their hair, hands, and faces were
required to look like were slightly different, the grooming and appearance standards were
basically equal. For this reason, the case was not covered under Title VII.
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Price Waterhouse v. Ann Hopkins

A similar case in 1989 turned out differently. After working for five years for
Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was proposed as a candidate for partnership. All of the
other 87 candidates were males. The 662 members of the partnership were given the task
of admitting new partners after evaluating their work, personalities, and attitudes.
Partners would fill out evaluation forms on any of the 88 candidates, depending on how
well they knew them. If a candidate got enough supporters, they were admitted as a
partner. Thirteen of the 32 partners that evaluated Hopkins supported her as a candidate.
But this was not enough support and Hopkins was not admitted. Instead, she was "held"
for reconsideration the next year.
She soon found out that many of the partners had commented on her interpersonal
skills on their evaluations. They called her "overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to
work with and impatient with staff' (Price Waterhouse vs. Hopkins).

One partner,

Thomas Beyer, explained that " in order to improve her chances for partnership [she]
should walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" (Price Waterhouse vs. Hopkins). Before the
next round of evaluations, Hopkins lost support from two of her supporters. When she
was not reconsidered for partnership, she resigned.
Not long after resigning, Hopkins sued Price Waterhouse for gender stereotyping.
She claimed that if she had been a male, she would have made partner because she would
not have been held to the same standards. The only reason she was not admitted was that
she did not conform to the gender related stereotypes that she was expected to conform
to. She used the evaluations as evidence, stating that they were a big part of the decision
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to admit candidates or not. Because many ofher evaluations were filled with suggestions
relating to gender stereotypes, the process was greatly influenced by these stereotypes. It
became the duty of Price Waterhouse to prove that Hopkins still would not have been
admitted if these comments had not been on her evaluations. But because the company
was unable to prove that the same decision would have been made without the comments,
Hopkins won her case.
This case is like the Jespersen case in that both women felt that they were being
forced to conform to society's standards of what a female should look like and act like.
Both women felt that the pressure to conform made them so uncomfortable that their only
choice was to leave the company. However, the outcomes of these cases were different.

In Jespersen's case, she was not being singled out. All female bartenders were being
required to follow the policy, and males also had their own set of standards. But Hopkins
was being singled out for not being feminine enough. If she had been a male, it would
not have been an issue and she would have been made a partner. The ultimate reason she
did not get the position was because of her gender. Therefore, her case was covered
under Title VII.

Elysa Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc.

In a 2005 case, a regional sales manager for L'Oreal refused to fire a sales
associate after a male supervisor claimed the associate was unattractive. The regional
sales manager, Elysa Yanowitz, began working for L'Oreal in 1981. Five years later, she
became a regional sales manager in California. After visiting one of the stores that
Yanowitz managed, one of her supervisors, Jack Wiswall, told her to terminate a sales
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associate that he thought was "not good looking enough" and demanded that she "get
someone hot," to take her place (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal). That same day, Wiswall pointed
out an attractive blonde woman and stated, "God damn it, get me one that looks like that"
(Yanowitz v. L'Oreal). Yanowitz asked Wiswall for adequate justification for firing the
woman and when he could not give her any, she refused to fire the sales associate.
Over the next few months, Wiswall began to give Yanowitz negative evaluations
and put her down in front of other employees.

The retaliation became so bad that

Yanowitz quit. She soon decided to sue her employer for retaliation against unlawful sex
discrimination.

Yanowitz alleged that she did not fire the sales associate because it

would have constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. She claimed that in all the
years she served as regional manager, she was never told to fire a male employee for
being unattractive. She asked Wiswall for adequate justification for firing the associate
and when he did not mention anything having to do with her performance, Yanowitz
refused to fire the associate.
The court stated that unless Wiswall could present evidence that being attractive
was a bona fide occupational qualification and that both males and females were
expected to be attractive, then Wiswall's demand to fire the unattractive female sales
associate was considered sex discrimination. Wiswall could not provide such evidence
but claimed that he did not know that Y anowitz believed his demand was sex
discrimination.

He claimed that Y anowitz never mentioned to him or any other

supervisor that she refused to follow Wiswall's order because she believed it was illegal
di scrimination based on sex.
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The court found that Yanowitz's repeated requests for adequate justification for
firing the sales associate was evidence that she believed Wiswall's request was
discrimination. This case was covered under Title VII because Wiswall was requiring
female sales associates to be more attractive than male sales associates. He had not once
told Yanowitz to fire a male for being unattractive but demanded she fire the female
associate and replace her with someone "hot." Like the Price Waterhouse case, if the
sales associate was a male, Wiswall would not have told Yanowitz to fire her.

Leslie Frank, et al. v. United Airlines Inc.

In 1994, a group of female flight attendants that worked for United Airlines sued
their employer for gender discrimination based on appearance. Beginning in 1980, both
male and female flight attendants were forced to meet specific weight requirements based
on age and height. United claimed that the weight tables were acceptable because they
were part of the company' s grooming standards.

If they could not meet these

requirements, the employees had the possibility of being suspended without pay or even
fired.
But while the males found it relatively easy to meet the weight requirements, the
requirements that were placed on the females were much stricter. On average, there was
a 14 to 25 pound difference in the amount that females and males of the same height and
age had to weigh. This was because United was using two separate weight tables that
were created by two different companies. The weight table that was used on males was
created by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company while the table that was used on
females was created by Continental Air Lines. The maximum weights for males came
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from the "large fi·ame" category but the maximum weights for females came from the
"medium frame" category.
Like the companies in the last few cases, United claimed that placing separate
appearance standards on male and female employees was not considered gender
discrimination. But gender specific appearance standards are only legal if they don't
burden one sex more than the other. The court stated that United was not just requiring
females to look different but to also physically change the shape of their body if
necessary.

Some of the women testified that they went as far as consuming fewer

calories, using diuretics, and even purging after they ate in order to meet the weight
requirements. Because females were being held to higher standards than males, the case
was covered under Title VII and the female flight attendants won their case against
United. On August 16, 1994, United Airlines stopped using weight tables and offered to
rehire anyone who had lost their job because of their weight.

Deborah Marks v. National Communications Association, Inc.
Another case dealing with gender related weight issues took place in New York in
1999. Deborah Marks began working for National Communications Association in May
1993. After being named employee of the month for August, September, November, and
December, she was named employee of the year. Although she received many awards
and prizes for her work as a telemarketer, her supervisors found it difficult to get along
with her. According to her supervisors and co-workers, she was constantly complaining
and blaming others when she didn't get what she wanted.
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At the beginning of 1994, she began asking to be promoted to sales
representative. In February, a woman named Selena Thomas got the position instead of
Marks. Thomas told Marks that their supervisor, Richard McGuire, had stated that if
Marks had lost weight, she would have been promoted also. At the time, Marks weighed
approximately 270 pounds. But Marks was not surprised by McGuire's comments. She
testified that McGuire had once told her that in "outside sales, presentation is extremely
important.

[If she lost] the weight [she would] get promoted" (Marks vs. National

Communications Association). For an entire week after not being promoted, Marks
complained to her co-workers that she was discriminated against by her supervisors. At
the end of the week, Marks was informed by two of her managers, John Fortgash and
Scott Chase, that she was being suspended for one week with no pay. The company
claimed that her suspension was due to her constant complaining, but Marks believed she
was suspended in retaliation for claiming she was the victim of discrimination. The day
after being suspended, Marks called Chase and taped their conversation. She told him
that instead of being su spended, she wanted to be fired so she could collect
unemployment. At first Chase refused. But after she repeatedly asked him to fire her, he
did.
More than a year later, Marks sued her former employer claiming that they did
not promote her because of weight standards that were applied exclusively to females.
She claimed that because she was overweight and not considered attractive by society's
standards, she was not promoted to the position of sales representative. But she believed
that overweight males working for the company were promoted to the same position.
She argued that if she were a male, she would have been promoted.
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As we saw in the last case, it is illegal for a company to demand that males and
females abide by restrictions that are unequally burdensome to one gender.

This is

especially true if the characteristic is immutable. However, the court stated that Marks
had to prove that the weight requirement was only being used on females. When asked
for documentation or any other evidence that confirmed her belief, Marks stated that she
didn't have any. Marks could only testify that she had seen overweight men walking
around the office and believed that they were sales representatives. She could not name a
single overweight male who held the sales representative position. Marks lost her case.
This case is different from the United case because there was no evidence that
weight requirements were being used on one gender only. The United flight attendants
had physical evidence that females were being required to weigh less. The weight tables
being used clearly required females to weigh 14 to 25 pounds less than males ofthe same
age and height. In both cases, the court stated that placing different constraints on males
and females is illegal if one gender is being unequally burdened. But there must be
evidence that such a policy exists or it cannot be covered under Title VII. Although
Marks could not prove that she was not promoted based on her sex, she could prove that
her appearance was an issue. But because there are no laws specifically designed to
protect against appearance discrimination, her claim was not valid.
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RACE

Langston Bradley v. PizzaCo of Nebraska, Inc.

Appearance discrimination based on race is another issue that may be covered
under Title VII. This is especially true when the discrimination could potentially affect a
large portion of a specific racial population.
In the early 1990's, Langston Bradley, an African American male, began working
for Domino's Pizza in Nebraska as a delivery driver.

When he was fired for not

complying with the company's no-beard policy, he claimed that he suffered from a
medical condition called pseudofolliculitis barbae that prevented him from shaving. The
skin condition affects nearly half of African American males, many of which cannot
shave at all ("Pseudofolliculitis Barbae"). Bradley alleged that the no-beard policy was
in violation of Title VII because it denied employment to a large population of African
American males. He filed a claim with the EEOC.
The EEOC made a prima facie case of adverse impact that was created by the
policy. The court then stated that the burden was on Domino's to demonstrate a business
justification for the policy. The vice president of Domino's, Paul Black, claimed that it
was "common sense [that] the better [their] people look, the better [their] sales will be"
(Bradley v. PizzaCo). He also believed that if the company made an exception to this
policy, they would have difficulty enforcing any other aspects of the dress code. The
court stated that Black's testimony did not provide any real evidence that the no-beard
policy was a business justification. He only speculated that sales would be lower and that
it would be difficult to enforce other aspects of the dress code if he eliminated the policy.
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In addition, the primary purpose of Domino's was to make and deliver pizzas. The court
found no cotTelation between the existence of a beard and the ability to make and deliver
pizzas.
The court ruled that although Domino's is permitted to incorporate grooming
standards into their dress code, they must make exceptions when it is medically
necessary. Therefore, African American males should not be forced to abide by the nobeard policy if they suffer from pseudofolliculitis barbae. The company can, however,
require that beards be neatly trimmed, clean, and a specified length. This case was
covered under Title VII because the policy was found to have an adverse impact on
African American males. However, not all appearance cases relating to race are covered
under Title VII.

Wandra McManus v. MCI Communications Corporation

In 1986, Wandra McManus, an African American female, was hired to work as a
secretary for MCI. She frequently came to work dressed in clothing and jewelry that
resembled traditional African attire. She usually had her hair in dreadlocks, braids, or
cornrows.

Many of her co-workers and managers remarked on her attire, making

comments such as "That is a pretty outfit. Oh, my, your ean1ngs are interesting. What
kind of hairstyle is this, how did they do this? You look like an African princess"
(McManus v. MCI).
Over the next eleven years, she was transferred to two other positions within the
company until she was terminated in August 1997. Two months before being terminated,
Bonnie Handy and Terri Sallay, two of McManus ' managers decided to eliminate
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McManus' position and replace it with a higher level job that required more fmmal
education. The position was offered to Trina Sehorn, an African American female with a
degree in finance. She turned the position down. Another African American female with
a degree in finance, Crystal Washington, was eventually given the position.

After

learning that her position was offered to two other African American females who
dressed more conservatively, she sued her employer for appearance discrimination based
on race.
To make out a prima facie case of race discrimination, McManus had to first
show that she was a member of a protected class and the employee who filled her
position was not a member of a protected class. McManus claimed that although the
females who were offered the position after her were also African American, she
belonged to a small division of African Americans who showed their heritage through
their attire, jewelry, and hairstyle. She believed she was terminated so that her position
could be filled by an African American female whose appearance was more traditional to
a corporate setting.
The court, however, did not believe that there were enough people who wore
traditional African clothing to be considered a specific division of the African American
race. Also, the court could not find a correlation between the comments made by her coworkers about her attire and her termination. In fact, many of the comments heard by the
court were complimentary. This case was not covered under Title VII because unlike
Bradley, McManus could not prove that this kind of discrimination, whether it existed in
this case or not, affected a large enough portion of the African American population. As
we will see in the next chapter, if this case had taken place in Washington D.C. where the

38

D.C. Human Rights Act prevents employers from even discussing an employee's
appearance, McManus' case may not have been dismissed.

RELIGION

EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car LLC

Appearance discrimination based on religion is another area that may be covered
under Title VII.

Many religions require that followers wear certain attire, a head

covering such as a scarf or turban, or wear their hair or facial hair in a specific way.
Some employers believe that by allowing their employees to wear religious garb in the
workplace, they are sending out the wrong signal to customers or other employees.
Bilan Nur, a Muslim from Somalia, was hired by Alamo Rent-A-Car in 1999.
Her position as a rental agent required her to interact with customers on a daily basis. As
part of the company's dress code policy, employees were prohibited from wearing certain
types of clothing and accessories.

When the Muslim holiday Ramadan began in

November 2001, Nur requested permission to wear a scarf over her head while working.
She was told that she could wear the scarf while working in the back office but had to
remove it while interacting with customers at the front desk. She was also told that she
would not be excused from working at the front desk during Ramadan. Over the next
few days, Nur refused to remove her scarf while working and was repeatedly sent home.
Each day, she was told that she would lose her job if she did not start following the dress
code. On December 6, she was informed that she was terminated for violating company
policy. She filed a claim with the EEOC for religious discrimination.
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According to Title VII, an individual must establish a prima facie case by
demonstrating that she had a bona fide religious belief, she informed her employer of the
belief, and she was fired because of her inability to perform a job function because of her
religious beliefs. Alamo alleged that Nur could not satisfy the first part of the prima facie
requirements because she followed company policy during Ramadan in 1999 and 2000.
This was the first year that she refused to take the scarf off while serving customers. But
the court stated that what Nur had done in previous years was not relevant to the sincerity
of her beliefs in 2001. The court felt that Nur established a prima facie case.
The burden shifted to Alamo who then had to prove that the company either
provided Nur with a reasonable accommodation or could not do so without enduring an
undue hardship.

The company claimed that Nur was provided with a reasonable

accommodation because she was allowed to wear her scarf while in the back office. But
the court found that requiring Nur to remove the scarf while working with customers and
not excusing her from working with customers was not an accommodation.

The

company then alleged that allowing Nur to wear her scarf while working with customers
would impose an undue hardship on the business because it opened the door for other
employees to violate the dress code policy. But the court determined that Alamo did not
provide any factual evidence that Nur was imposing an undue hardship on the business.
Because Alamo failed to provide a reasonable accommodation and could not
prove that Nur's scarf imposed an undue hardship, the court found in favor of Nur and
the EEOC.

This case was covered under Title VII because Alamo was clearly

discriminating against Nur because of her religious practice.
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Brenda Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28

In a similar case in 2003, an assistant teacher in Pennsylvania, Brenda Nichol,
was fired for wearing a cross necklace to the school where she worked. A provision of
the dress code prohibited teachers and staff members from wearing religious attire and
jewelry while on school property. Even though Nichol had worked at the school and
wore the necklace on a regular basis for almost six years, it wasn't until March 2003 that
she was specifically told by her supervisor, Robert Truscello, not to wear the necklace or
to tuck it in her shirt. He claimed that wearing the necklace in front of elementary
students would cause a disturbance by subjecting them to Nichol's religious expression.
A month later, Truscello approached Nichol again and told her that she had until the end
of the week to comply with the policy or she would be suspended. The next week,
Nichol visibly wore the necklace to work and was suspended.
Nichol decided to sue her employer for religious discrimination under Title VII.
She claimed that not wearing the cross necklace or tucking it into her shirt was like
denying her faith in her religion. Nichol established a prima facie case of discrimination
and the court turned to Truscello to prove that the cross necklace was a disturbance in a
classroom setting. But Truscello could not do so because for almost six years, he had not
even noticed that Nichol wore the necklace on a regular basis. Also, not a single student,
parent, or teacher complained that the cross offended them in any way.

The court

ordered the school to reinstate Nichol.
In both the case against Alamo and the case against the school, an employee was
fired for not complying with the dress code because of a religious belief. Both cases
were covered under Title VII because the employees demonstrated that their religious
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belief was sincere. They both explained to their employer that by asking them to put
away their religious accessories they were asking them to deny their faith. This next case
turns out differently for the employee.

Sheldon Swartzentruber v. Gunite Corporation

Sheldon Swartzentruber, a member of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,
began working for Gunite Corporation in May 1993. Five years later, Mark Nelson, a
manager at Gunite, started receiving reports that Swartzentruber was displaying an
offensive tattoo while working. The tattoo was on his forearm and showed a hooded
Klan member standing in front of a burning cross. Nelson asked Swartzentruber to keep
his tattoo covered while at work because his co-workers, especially his African American
co-workers, were offended by the tattoo. Nelson told him that the only time it could be
left uncovered was when he was in the bathroom cleaning the new tattoo. He was told
that if he refused to cover the tattoo at all times other than when he had to clean it, he
would be disciplined for his actions.

Swartzentruber never mentioned to Nelson or

anyone else at Gunite that his tattoo was a symbol of his religion or that his religion
required him to display the tattoo.
A few weeks later, Nelson was still receiving complaints from Swartzentruber's
co-workers that he was not covering his tattoo. Nelson asked two of his supervisors to
observe Swartzentruber for a few days to see if the reports were accurate. They reported
that he kept the tattoo covered but that he was unhappy with the way he was being
watched.

Swartsentruber felt that he was being harassed by his co-workers and

supervisors and decided to sue his employer for religious discrimination.
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He began by stating that he had been a member of the Church of the American
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan since 1996. The tattoo on his arm of a burning cross was
one of the sacred symbols of the church. But Swartzentruber failed to show proofthat his
religion forbid him from covering the tattoo at work. He also failed to ever mention his
religious beliefs to anyone at Gunite.

Because no one knew that his tattoo was a

reflection of his religion, Swartzentruber could not prove that the "harassment" was due
to his religious beliefs. The court found that while Swartzentruber's religious beliefs may
have been sincere, his case was not covered under Title VII (Swartzentruber vs. Gunite).

NATIONAL ORIGIN

James Craig, et al. v. County of Los Angeles
Appearance discrimination based on national origin is another issue that may be
covered under Title VII.

Sometimes employers create dress codes and appearance

policies that may eliminate individuals from foreign countries from qualifying for a
position. In 1980, a class action lawsuit was brought against Los Angeles County on
behalf of a group of Mexican-Americans who believed they were being discriminated
against based on their national origin. They were referring to a height requirement that
eliminated many of them from qualifying for the position of police officer.
The height requirements for police officers in Los Angeles County until May
1975 were 67 inches for males and 63 inches for females. These requirements eliminated
41 percent of Mexican-American males and 74 percent of Mexican-American females
that applied for the position. This can be compared to only 14 percent of all other males

43

and 50 percent of all other females who did not meet the height requirement. The district
court found that this policy was not discriminatory because as the police department
alleged, height is related to the ability to apply physical restraint when necessary and the
ability to command respect from the community.
But during the appeal, the court demanded that the police department provide
actual evidence that a height requirement is job related. Again, the sheriff and a physical
training instructor testified that height was important when commanding respect and
applying physical strength. They alleged that because police officers spend a portion of
their time breaking up fights and dispersing crowds, physical strength and the ability to
command respect are important characteristics associated with height for a police officer
to possess.
But the court found that although it is important for police officers to be strong
and have the ability to command respect, there is no evidence that height is directly
correlated to either of these characteristics. The police department failed to show that the
height requirement was job related, and because the requirement had an adverse impact
on a large segment of the Mexican-American population, the department was forced to
remove the height requirement from their list of qualifications. The court stated that the
police department should instead create a test that measures the strength of potential
police officers rather than just height.
This case was covered under Title VII because it had an adverse impact on
Mexican-Americans. While the police department was not trying to discriminate against
this group of people, the height requirement eliminated a large segment of their
population.
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What links these cases together?

These cases are just a few examples of how Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 may be used against employers who discriminated against applicants or employees
based on their appearance. The first few cases deal with gender related stereotypes or
gender specific dress codes. In Carroll v. Talman Federal, the employer was basing the
decision to force only females to wear uniforms on the belief that they could not be
trusted to wear appropriate business attire. Talman Federal was clearly discriminating
against females just for being females. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Ann Hopkins
was accused of acting and speaking too masculine.

She was not admitted into the

company's partnership simply because of this reason. If she had been a male, her so
called masculine traits, would not have been an issue. In Yanowitz v. L'Oreal, Yanowitz
was mistreated for failing to obey a disctiminatory policy.

She refused to fire an

unattractive female employee because she had never been told to fire an unattractive
male. This too is a case where the employee was discriminated against just for being a
female. In Jespersen v. Harrah's, Ann Jespersen believed she was the victim of gender
discrimination based on the "personal best" policy that required she wear make up. But
because she was not being singled out and because males had their own set of standards,
the court ruled in favor of Harrah's. These cases demonstrate that if the employee can
prove that the only reason they were discriminated against was because of their gender
and/or they were being singled out, they will most likely win their case.
In Frank v. United Airlines, the weight tables that were being used on females
were clearly harsher than the weight tables being used on males. There was physical
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proof that one gender was being held to a higher standard than the other. But in Marks v.
National Communications Association, Marks could not prove that overweight males
were being promoted to jobs that overweight females were not. Marks could only testify
that she had seen overweight males working as sales representatives. In these types of
cases, it's important to have some kind of evidence that shows that discrimination is
taking place.
Jespersen's case and Mark's case were not covered under Title VII because they
could not be associated with sex discrimination. Because there are no laws protecting
them from appearance discrimination, their cases were dismissed.
In the Bradley v. PizzaCo, the EEOC proved that a no-beard policy was

discriminatory toward African American males because nearly half of them suffer from a
skin condition that prevents them from shaving. But in McManus v. MCI, McManus
could not prove that she was discriminated against because she belonged to a division of
the African American community that wore traditional African attire.

These cases

demonstrate that appearance-based race cases must affect a significant population to be
covered under Title VII.
In the religion-based appearance cases EEOC v. Alamo and Nichol v. ARIN, both
women were terminated for refusing to follow dress code policies that demanded they
remove their religious accessories. Both cases were covered under Title VII because the
women demonstrated that their religious beliefs were sincere and the reason for their
termination. Also, the employers in these cases could not prove that allowing them to
wear their accessories would cause an undue hardship on the business. However, in
Swartzentrber v. Gunite Corporation, Swartzentruber had difficulty because he had no
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evidence that discrimination was occurring. He had no proof that his religion required
him to keep his tattoo covered and never even revealed to anyone at Gunite that his tattoo
was a symbol of his religion. Perhaps, if he had expressed to his supervisors that his
tattoo was a part of his religion, he would have been able to demonstrate that
discrimination was occurring.
In Craig v. County of Los Angeles, the Mexican-Americans were covered under

Title VII because the height requirement they were subjected to was eliminating 41
percent of males and 74 percent of females. This is considered appearance discrimination
based on national origin because the average height of Mexicans is three to four inches
shorter than the average height of Caucasians (Hanson).

By creating a policy that

eliminates a large population of people because of a characteristic relating to their
national origin, the police department was discriminating against Mexican-Americans.
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Chapter 5
State & Local Laws
Although there are no federal laws protecting employees from appearance
discrimination, a few states have begun to create laws that may help victims in some
situations. In this chapter, we will take a look at some of these laws and how they have
been interpreted in the courtroom.

Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act
In 1976, Michigan introduced the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

The act

prevents discrimination based on religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height,
weight, familial status, and marital status.

Although it does not directly prohibit

discrimination based on appearance, height and weight, which are factors of appearance,
are included in the act. This is important because it was the first time that any state
included any appearance related issues in their laws against discrimination.
The Act states that victims of height or weight discrimination must present direct
evidence or a prima facie case when using this law to sue their employer. The employer
must then prove that termination would have occurred regardless of weight or height.
But if the employee can prove that height or weight was the reason for the employer's
decision, even if it was not the only reason or the main reason, they have won the case.
This law has prevented employers from firing or refusing to hire overweight or obese
people. As we saw in the ADA cases, victims had to prove that their weight was either
related to a disability or a perceived disability. Thanks to the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights
Act, an employer is prohibited from making decisions based on a person's weight,
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regardless of whether they are disabled or perceived as being disabled.

The only

exception to the act is when height or weight is considered a bona fide occupational
qualification or a business necessity (Adamitis).
The next two cases are examples of how employees in Michigan have used the
Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act against their employers.

Barbara Ann Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation

Barbara Lamoria began working as a nurse for Sun Valley Retirement Home in
September 1975. Ruth Wilcox, the director of nursing at Sun Valley, stated that Lamoria
was, "honest and credible and trustworthy" (Lamoria vs. Health Care). In 1991 , after
sixteen years of service to Sun Valley, Lamoria was promoted to the position of Nurse
Manager. In 1993, Marilyn Martin was hired as administrator of Sun Valley. Over the
next few months, Martin began making comments about the appearance of certain
employees, such as Lamoria, in the presence of other employees.

She specifically

targeted overweight and older employees of the nursing home. The next year, Lamoria
and other long time employees were fired and replaced by younger, more attractive
employees. Lamoria decided to sue her former employer for weight discrimination under
the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.
The Act states that a victim must present direct evidence or a prima facie case.
During the trial, the court heard the testimony of two other Sun Valley employees, Faith
Hall and Brenda LaVigne. Faith Hall, who was a Nurse Consultant, stated that at her first
meeting with Martin, Martin commented that she wanted to "clean house," meaning she
wanted to get rid of certain employees. Hall testified that she heard Martin refer to the
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list of people she wanted to fire as a "hit list." She also heard Martin make comments
about some of the overweight employees, including Barbara Lamoria. Hall said that
Martin spoke as though it was her intent to get rid of anyone she felt was overweight
(Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.).
Brenda LaVigne, a social worker at the retirement home, testified that Martin
claimed that she did not like overweight people. Like Hall, LaVigne also heard Martin
make comments about the weight of several Sun Valley employees. Martin later fired
three of these overweight women. They were immediately replaced with younger, more
attractive employees.

LaVigne stated that she felt Martin was trying to enhance the

image of the retirement home by getting rid of employees simply because they were
overweight.
According to the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must prove that
weight was a determining factor in his or her termination. The testimony that came from
Faith Hall and Brenda LaVigne convinced the court that if Lamoria had not been
overweight, she would not have been fired . Even though Martin claimed that other
factors were involved in her decision to fire Lamoria, the comments she made about
Lamoria's weight and the weight of other Sun Valley employees were considered direct
evidence that she intended to fire certain people because of their weight. If Lamoria had
to rely on the ADA, she would not have won her case because there is no evidence that
she was fired because of a disability or a perceived disability. But because weight is
specifically covered in the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Lamoria won her case.
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Vincent Byrnes v. Frito-Lay, Inc.

Vincent Byrnes began working for Frito-Lay in 1970. With the help of Fred
Cahill, the division sales manager, Byrnes worked his way from warehouse manager to
district manager to regional sales manager. In 1988, Cahill was replaced by Mary Ellen
Johnson. Byrnes did not get along with Johnson and claimed that her management style
was irritating and that she discriminated against him for being overweight. He was fired
in May 1990. He sued his former employer for weight discrimination under the Elliot-

Larsen Civil Rights Act.
As we saw in the Lamoria case, Byrnes had to prove that his weight was a factor
in Johnson's decision to fire him. He claimed that during a performance appraisal with
Johnson, she stated that if he wanted to get promoted again he would have to lose weight.
The comment was not included in the written portion of the performance review and
Johnson denied making the statement. She claimed that she fired Byrnes because he was
no longer qualified for the position after he took a medical leave that lasted from late
1989 to mid-1990.
In September 1989, Byrnes' doctor suggested he take a medical leave to avoid the

stress at work and control his blood pressure. Byrnes claimed that his stress was directly
related to Johnson's management style. He claimed that she rarely asked for his input
and when she did, she did not listen to what he had to say. He also claimed that she
lacked any compassion for him or other employees. He testified that after his daughter
got into an accident while driving the company car, Johnson cared more about the car
than the safety of his daughter. He also testified that she made harassing phone calls to
his office every Monday and asked him to provide detailed information about the
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previous week's sales, all from memory. The doctor recommended that he return to work
under the supervision of someone else and work only twenty hours each week. Because
there was no position available that fit these restrictions, Byrnes could not return to work
and was fired.
Because there was no proof that Johnson ever made a comment about Byrnes'
weight, he had the burden of proving a prima facie case. He bad to show that he was a
member of a protected class, that he was qualified for the job, that he was fired, and then
was replaced by someone who was not a member of a protected class. According to the
Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Byrnes' weight classified him as a protected group
member. But because of the recommendations that his doctor made, he was no longer
qualified for the position.
In the Lamoria case, the victim had direct evidence that weight was a determining
factor in the decision to fire her. Even though the defendant claimed that weight had
nothing to do with Lamoria's termination, the comments that were overheard by other
employees indicated that weight discrimination was involved. But in the Byrnes case, the
victim did not have any direct evidence and could not prove a prima facie case.
Therefore, he was not covered under the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

The District of Columbia Human Rights Act

One year after the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act was created, the District of
Columbia followed Michigan's lead and introduced the DC Human Rights Act.

In

addition to religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status,
and marital status, DC added personal appearance, sexual orientation, family
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responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, disability, source of income, and place
of residence or business to the act. This was the first time that any body of government
in the United States specifically protected its citizens from discrimination based on
personal appearance. Victims do not have to relate their discrimination to race, religion,
disability or any other form of discrimination and are not

limite~

to height or weight

discrimination as with the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.
The DC Act is like the Michigan Act in that employees must present direct
evidence or a prima facie case. Applicants or employees in D.C. cases maintain the
ultimate burden of proof. If an employer considered appearance in any way before firing
or refusing to hire an employee, they have broken the law. Exceptions include when
appearance is a bona fide occupational qualification or business necessity. The Act also
does not apply to regulations concerning cleanliness, prescribed standards of dress, or
that require employees to wear uniforms (Adamitis).

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights

In June of 1979, Elisa J anetis began working for the Atlantic Richfield Company
in their office located in the District of Columbia. During her third week with the
company, Rachel Morgret who was the supervisor of Office Administration, began
commenting on Janetis' appearance. She criticized her for the way her blouses fit, saying
they were too tight and showed too much cleavage. She also commented on the price of
Janetis' clothes and asked her where she got the money to buy such expensive clothing.
She soon began to make remarks about Janetis ' behavior. She claimed that she sat with
her legs open too wide and was too friendly to the male visitors that carne into the office.
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Morgret asked Janetis if she received phone numbers from men visiting the office and
questioned whether it was a form of sexual solicitation.
In her three-month evaluation, Morgret criticized Janetis for her tight and

revealing clothing and her inappropriate behavior. She also commented that her behavior
at a company party resembled the behavior of a prostitute. The next day, Janetis filed a
claim with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights. She claimed that Morgret
was harassing her because of her appearance. A few days later, she met with the head of
Atlantic Richfield's D.C. office, Edgar Twine. During the meeting, Twine threatened
Janetis and told her that she would never find work again if she continued with her claim.
He also told her to resign from the company. In October of 1979, Janetis resigned but did
not drop her claim against the company.
Janetis began looking for work through the agency that placed her with Atlantic
Richfield, but could not find a company that would hire her.

Linda Horst, an

employment counselor with the agency, told Janetis that her experience with Atlantic
Richfield was probably to blame for her inability to find work. In January 1981 , Janetis
found work with a law firm and quickly learned that her supervisor was friends with a
person that worked at the employment agency and knew about the problems she had with
Atlantic Richfield.

She was concerned that her supervisor would learn about the

problems and become dissatisfied with her performance. Janetis resigned from the law

firm in June 1981. She did not apply for any more office jobs because of her anxiety
relating to her experience at Atlantic Richfield.
The D.C. Office of Human Rights approved Janetis' complaint for a public
bearing. She claimed that according to the D.C. Human Rights Act, the treatment she
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received was considered discrimination based on appearance. Janetis established a prima
facie case when she showed evidence that her clothes were similar to the clothing worn
by other Atlantic Richfield employees. When the burden shifted to Atlantic Richfield,
the company claimed that her clothing violated dress code standards. The company also
claimed that letting Janetis walk around with her cleavage showing, would likely lead to
a claim of sexual harassment. But when the burden shifted back to Janetis, she stated that
although her clothing was similar to the clothing of other employees, she was the only
one that was criticized. She also stated that her moral character was questioned and her
behavior was compared to that of a prostitute because of her appearance. Because the
D.C. Human Rights Act specifically covers personal appearance and Morgret's
comments about Janetis' appearance contrib~ted to her resignation, Janetis won her case.

Patricia Underwood v. Archer Management Services, Inc.
In October 1993, Patricia Underwood began working for Archer Management

Services as a receptionist.

In just over a month, she was fired because she was a

transsexual and maintained some masculine traits.

She decided to sue Archer

Management Services for appearance discrimination under the D.C. Human Rights Act.
According to the Act, an employer cannot discriminate against someone because of their
appearance. Underwood claimed that because her surgery and medical treatments to
become a woman were not finished, she still maintained some masculine traits. She felt
that she was fired because of these traits.
Underwood established a prima facie case by demonstrating that she maintained
some masculine traits. When the burden shifted to Archer, the company did not have a
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nondiscriminatory reason for firing Underwood.

Although transsexuals are not

specifically covered by the D.C. Human Rights Act, discrimination based on personal
appearance is covered.

Because Underwood's appearance, her masculine traits in

particular, were considered when deciding to fire her, the court ruled that she was
covered by the Act.

Santa Cruz, CA Human Rights Ordinance
In 1992, the Santa Cruz, CA Human Rights Ordinance was created.

The

ordinance prohibits discrimination based on age, race, color, creed, religion, national
origin, ancestry, disability, marital status, sex, gender, sexual orientation, height, weight
and physical characteristics. Like the DC Human Rights Act, the ordinance was intended
to prevent discrimination based on personal appearance. But the people of Santa Cruz
responded negatively to the idea of having to protect people because of their appearance.
They claimed that because a large percentage of Santa Cruz's population elected to have
cosmetic surgery and improve their personal appearance, the ordinance should not
include "physical characteristics."

The ordinance was changed so that "physical

characteristics" did not refer to appearance in general, but to physical characteristics as a
result ofbirth defect, accident, or disease (Adamitis).

What links these laws and cases together?
Michigan, the District of Columbia, and the city of Santa Cruz are among the first
territories in the United States to create laws that prohibit discrimination based on factors
of appearance.

The Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act prevents discrimination
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based on religion, color, national origin, age, sex, familial status, marital status, height
and weight. Although it does not directly address appearance, it addresses height and
weight. The Act states that the plaintiff does not need to prove that height or weight was
the only reason or even the main reason for being terminated. In the Lamoria case, the
defendant was heard making comments about the weight of an employee that she later
fired. Because Lamoria had direct evidence that she was fired partly because of her
weight, she won her case. However, in the case against Frito-Lay, Victor Byrnes did not
have any direct evidence and could not prove a prima facie case of discrimination.
The District of Columbia Human Rights Act was the first act to specifically
prohibit discrimination based on appearance. Like the Michigan act, this act does not
require the plaintiff to prove that appearance was the sole reason for discrimination. In
the case against Atlantic Richfield, Elisa Janetis was the victim of continuous negative
comments relating to her appearance. The comments went so far as to compare her to a
prostitute. Because the negative comments contributed to Janetis' resignation, the court
ruled in her favor.

In the Underwood case, the defendant could not gtve a

nondiscriminatory reason for firing the transsexual.

Although transsexuals are not

covered by the act, Patricia Underwood was fired for maintaining some masculine traits.
Because these traits are factors of appearance, the court ruled in her favor.
The last act that was covered in this chapter is the Santa Cmz Ordinance. It's
different from the other two acts because it does not cover factors of appearance in
general. It specifically covers physical characteristics derived only from birth, accident,
or disease.
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These cases are just a few examples of how laws that are designed specifically to
prevent appearance discrimination can protect employees. Without these laws, Lamoria,
Janetis, and Underwood would not have received any compensation for the
discrimination they endured.

Because their discrimination was based solely on

appearance, they would not have been covered under the Due Process Clause, Title VII,
or the ADA.

Citizens in Michigan, D.C., Santa Cruz, and other areas that have

introduced similar laws have the ability to address appearance discrimination head on,
while applicants and employees in the rest of the U.S. must use other laws in an attempt
to sue their employers.
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Chapter 6
Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications
In the last few chapters, I have discussed the laws that applicants and employees
have used in an attempt to sue their employers for appearance discrimination. In all of
these cases, the applicant or employee was forced to relate their appearance
discrimination to another form of illegal discrimination.

But even when they can

successfully do so, an employer may claim that the standard or policy is a bona fide
occupational qualification.

What is a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification?

A bona fide occupational qualification, or a BFOQ, is a legitimate reason to
discriminate. An employer may request a BFOQ if"the essence of the business operation
would be undermined if the business eliminated its discriminatory policy" ("Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification").

Employers have used BFOQs for reasons of privacy,

safety, or authenticity. BFOQs may not be based on assumptions or stereotypes. Race
and color may never be a BFOQ. Gender may be a BFOQ if it is absolutely necessary
that the employee be a certain gender. For example, many nursing home facilities that
separate residents according to gender can require that staff members be the same gender
as the patients with whom they will be working. This is because the employer may be
concerned with the residents ' privacy as staff members may be expected to help patients
use the bathroom or shower. However, gender may not be considered a BFOQ when the
policy is based on a stereotype such as the belief that men are better at sales than women.
National origin may be a BFOQ when members of a certain origin may not be able to get
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necessary clearance for security reasons ("Civil Rights Fact Sheet"). Religion may be a
BFOQ when membership in a certain religion is necessary to perform the job. For
example, a Catholic school may require that the teachers they hire be Catholic. They
cannot, however, require that the janitors they hire be Catholic ("Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification"). Age may be a BFOQ when safety is involved, such as requiring school
bus drivers to retire at a certain age. In some circumstances, a certain type of appearance
may be a BFOQ. Employers may require that their employees look or dress a certain
way.

Often the employer is trying to portray a certain image and the result is

discrimination against an entire group of people who do not fit the image.
An employer always has the burden of proving that the BFOQ is legitimate. To
justify a BFOQ, the employer must first show that the policy is reasonably connected to
the duties that will be performed. Next, the employer must demonstrate that the policy
was created in good faith and not for discriminatory purposes. Last, the employer must
show that it would place an undue hardship on the company to try to accommodate
employees who do not meet the restrictions. In this chapter, I will discuss how some
employers have tried to use an appearance related BFOQ defense in discrimination cases.

Playboy Clubs International, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
International Union

Between May and July 1970, thirteen women working at the New York Playboy
Club were fired for losing the "Bunny Image" (Playboy Clubs. vs. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders International). According to the Playboy Bunny recruitment
brochure, the Bunny Image consisted of "a charming personality ... cheerful disposition
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... attractive appearance and posture . . .intelligence and common sense ... and a pleasant
speaking voice." Bunnies were required to wear a costume that included a tight corset,
bunny ears, and a cottontail. Bunnies were responsible for welcoming guests, serving
drinks to club members, and selling gifts in the gift shop. Before each shift, Bunnies had
to pass a small inspection. Their uniforms had to be neat, their appearance flawless, and
they had to be weighed. Bunnies could not gain or lose more than a pound. Each Bunny
was rated according to how well she upheld the Bunny Image. A score of one meant that
she was a "flawless beauty."

A score of two meant that she was an "exceptionally

beautiful girl" but may have had some minor flaws. A score of three meant that she was
"marginal," or that she had "developed a correctable appearance problem," such as
gaining more than a pound. A score of four meant that she had "lost her Bunny Image."
If a Bunny received a score of four, she could be fired (Playboy Clubs. vs. Hotel &
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International).
The thirteen women sued under the New York Human Rights Law. They claimed
that being fired for losing the Bunny Image was discrimination. But Playboy claimed
that an attractive appearance was a BFOQ.

They claimed that Playboy was in the

business of selling sex and promoting sex appeal. The clubs were based on the allure of
attractive, young women. If a woman could not meet the requirements of the Bunny

I

I

Image, she was no longer qualified to work in the club.
The New York Human Rights Appeal Board agreed. They established that sex
appeal was a BFOQ "where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity and
genuineness" (McGinley, 268). The main objective of the Playboy Clubs was not to
serve drinks to customers but to promote the Playboy brand-sex appeal. An attractive
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appearance was central to the brand image. If a Bunny could not meet the requirements
of the Bunny Image, she could not promote the brand. The image of Playboy would be
destroyed and the clubs would start losing customers.

Savino Latuga, et al. v. Hooters, Inc.

In a similar case dealing with brand image, four men in 1995 applied for positions
as waiters at Hooters and were rejected. The company declared that they did not hire
male servers, bartenders, or hosts. They would only hire males to work in the kitchen.
Like Playboy, Hooters claimed that to maintain a certain brand image, they only hired
women to work in front of the house positions. The Hooters image includes a scantily
clad wait staff in a casual dining atmosphere. If they started hiring men, their image
would change and they would be just like every other casual dining restaurant.
But the EEOC did not see it that way. They claimed that the primary purpose of
Hooters restaurants was to serve food and drinks to consumers, unlike the Playboy Clubs
whose primary purpose was to sell an image of sex appeal. They stated that "no physical
trait unique to women is required to serve food and drink to customers in a restaurant."
(Bovard) After hundreds more men claimed they had received the same treatment from
Hooters, the EEOC demanded that they pay $22 million to the men who had never even
worked for the company. They also demanded that they start hiring men for front of the
house positions.
Hooters response was to begin an ad campaign that featured the message
"Washington Get a Grip" ("Hooters Fight"). They posted the message on billboards and
in newspapers.

They gave customers Frisbees attached to comment cards that were
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addressed to Washington and already had postage. Embarrassed by the whole ordeal, the
EEOC took back the demand to pay the $22 million but insisted that Hooters find a place
for men in their restaurants, other than in the kitchen. Many Hooters Restaurants now
allow men to apply for bartender and host positions but still require that servers be
women.

Gregory Wilson, et al. v. Southwest Airlines Company

Another company that tried to use the BFOQ defense was Southwest Airlines. In
1981, over 100 male applicants sued the airline company for gender discrimination under
Title VII. All the men claimed that while Southwest let them apply for flight attendant
positions, none of them were hired. The company admitted to the discrimination but
stated that they hired only female flight attendants and ticket agents to uphold the image
they had displayed since going into business in 1971. Like Hooters, this image was one
of sex appeal. Flight attendants were attractive, young women who wore tight tops, short
/.

I

shorts, and high boots. They were featured in newspaper, magazine and television ads
and assisted in promotional events.

The company claimed that the female flight

attendants came to be known as the symbol of the airline and were crucial to the
company's success.
The court stated that since Southwest admitted to the discrimination, the company
was now responsible for justifying the BFOQ defense using a two step test. The first part
of the test asks whether the job requires employees to be one sex only. The purpose of
this step is to see whether members of the other sex could or could not perform the
necessary duties of the job. The second part of the test asks whether those duties are

63

necessary to the business. The purpose of .this step is to see whether the business could
survive if members of the opposite sex were hired for the position. Southwest stated that
while they believed males and females could perform the necessary duties including
checking baggage, taking tickets, and serving food and drinks, they believed that females
were better at giving personalized service to the airlines mostly male passengers. They
also stated that since Southwest's image was one of sex appeal, male flight attendants
could not perfmm the necessary duties.
The court, however, declared that the primary purpose of an airline company is to
get passengers from one point to another in the quickest and safest fashion. A flight
attendant's main duties include loading and unloading passengers, demonstrating safety
equipment, and serving food and drinks. Males and females can perform this function
with equal skill. While sexy female flight attendants may serve as a sort of in-flight
entertainment for male passengers, these duties are secondary to the ones listed above.
Since airlines are not in the business of selling sex, the ability to perform the duties of a
flight attendant should be the only criteria used when hiring new employees.
The company then tried to claim that a large portion of their male customers
would no longer use the airline if they saw male flight attendants. They conducted two
surveys to try to prove that the sexy female flight attendants were so important to the
company's image that Southwest would begin to lost profits if they were forced to hire
males. But the surveys actually did the opposite. Passengers chose categories like "on
time departures," "frequently scheduled departures," and "convenient departure times."
"Courteous and attentive hostesses" ranked fifth and "attractive hostesses" was not near
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the top of the list. The court determined that Southwest had not proved that their BFOQ
defense was valid (Wilson vs. Southwest Airlines).

Eduardo Gonzalez, et al. v. Abercrombie & Fitch

While Playboy, Hooters, and Southwest Airlines admitted to intentionally
discriminating against male applicants, this next company claims that the discrimination
was unintentional. In 2003, a group of minorities and women sued Abercrombie & Fitch
for discrimination based on race and gender. They claimed that the clothing retailer
discriminated against them in four different ways. They either refused to hire them,
assigned them work only in the stock room, did not promote them, or fired or reduced
their hours at work. They claimed that they were discriminated against because they did
"not promote the A&F look" (Kahn). Abercrombie & Fitch, along with the two other
stores they owned, Abercrombie Kids and Hollister, typically hired a staff that resembled
"well-to-do sorority kids" (Esemplare). To recruit employees, the company has been
known to target college fraternities and sororities where they know they will easily be
able to find people that fit the "A&F look." Because the "look" is typical of white males,
very few minorities get hired by the company.
During the trial, the court heard testimony from former employees who felt they
were discriminated against. Euardo Gonzalez, alleged that he applied for a position as a
sales associate but was told that he could only work in the stock room because he didn't
fit the image. Jennifer Lu was fired after a corporate representative came into the store
where she worked and told the manager that he wanted employees to resemble the white
models in the store's ad. Four other Asian American and African American employees
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were fired that week and replaced by five white employees. The company claimed that
they were not intentionally firing or refusing to hire minorities, but most minorities did
not fit the image.

In less than two years, the company settled with the victims who were awarded
$40 million. The court also created a list of requirements relating to hiring and job
assignments. The company was ordered to create goals for hiring minorities and women
and report on these goals regularly. They are no longer allowed to target colleges when
recruiting. They were ordered to hire 25 recruiters to specifically target minorities and
women. They were also ordered to market their products to minorities by using them in
their ads.
Abercrombie · & Fitch tried to use the BFOQ defense for hiring mostly white
males to work in their stores. They claimed that the image they wanted to portray was
rarely shown by minority employees.

Although they may not have intentionally

discriminated against minorities and women, the fact that their image required them to
hire mostly white males was not an acceptable BFOQ.

Kimberly M. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.

This last case does not deal with discrimination of an entire class but rather one

I

individual. Kimberly Cloutier began working for Costco as a front-end assistant in July
1997. She had multiple piercings and tattoos but no facial piercings. In September of
that year, she was transferred to the deli section. In 1998, a new dress code was created
that prohibited deli employees from wearing jewelry while working. Cloutier refused to
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remove her jewelry and asked to be moved back to her old position at the front-end of the
store. Her request was approved and she was promoted to cashier.
Cloutier spent the next two years taking part in different aspects of body
modification, including facial piercings. In 2001 , Costco again revised their dress code
which prohibited facial piercings other than earrings. When the store began to enforce
the new dress code later that year, Cloutier was told that she had to remove her eyebrow
ring. The next day, Cloutier returned to work still wearing the jewelry. When she was
confronted by a manager, she told him that she was a member of the Church of Body
Modification. She told him that tattoos and piercings, including her facial piercing, were
a part of her religion. But after finding out that the religion did not require members to
display their tattoos and piercings at all times, Cloutier was told once more to remove her
eyebrow ring. She refused and filed a religious discrimination complaint with the EEOC.
She returned to work a few days later and suggested that she place a band-aid
over the piercing instead of removing it. Her suggestion was declined and she was sent
home for the day. Cloutier was told that she could return to work when she did not have
any facial piercings. After a few weeks of missing work, she received a letter telling her
she had been fired. A month later, Costco offered to let Cloutier return to work with a
band-aid covering her piercing. Even though this was originally her suggestion, she
refused to return and stated that the only reasonable accommodation was to excuse her
I

)

I

from the dress code.
But Costco responded by saying that a professional appearance was a BFOQ and
letting Cloutier be excused from the dress code was an undue hardship. The company
claimed that they wanted to have a professional and appropriate image in the minds of
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their customers. Allowing employees to have facial piercings did not fit this image.
Also, Costco proved that they had offered Cloutier a reasonable accommodation of
placing a band-aid over her piercing, which according to the religion's website was
permitted. Because Cloutier simply refused to follow the dress code and denied the
accommodation, she was not rehired. The court stated that Costco's BFOQ defense was
valid because it did not intrude on Cloutier's religious practices according to the website,
and because they had offered her a reasonable accommodation.

What links these cases together?

These cases all deal with an employer's demand for employees who fit a certain
image. Whether they realize it or not, they are discriminating against those individuals
who do not fit the image. They are compelled to use the BFOQ defense when their
requirements are called into question. All the employers in this chapter claimed that the
reason for their BFOQ was authenticity. If the court believed that the authenticity of the
business would be jeopardized if the policy was eliminated, they would find in favor of
the employer. If they did not believe that the genuineness of the business relied on the
BFOQ, they would find in favor of the employee.
Playboy alleged that their requirement of employing only attractive females in

I

their clubs was valid because they wanted to portray an image of sex appeal. The court

I

determined that since Playboy was in the business of selling sex, their BFOQ was valid.

I

But Hooters and Southwest Airlines did not get the same response. Because Hooters'
primary purpose was to serve food and drinks and Southwest's primary purpose was to
transport passengers, their requirement of hiring only females was not considered
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legitimate. Abercrombie & Fitch's decision to hire employees that portrayed an image
that was popular among mostly white fraternity kids was also considered illegitimate.
They found no correlation between having this image and selling clothes. But Costco's
requirement that their employees not have facial piercings was considered valid because
it took away from the company's reasonably professional appearance.
These cases demonstrate that a BFOQ must relate to the essence of the business
for it to be legal. But what would happen to the BFOQ defense if employers were
prohibited from making decisions based on appearance? Would Playboy be forced to
hire unattractive females or even males to work in their club? Would Cloutier be able to
wear her facial piercings to work? These are just some of the questions that would have
to be answered if a federal law prohibiting appearance discrimination was created. In the
next chapter, I will discuss the problems and benefits that would result from legislation
banning appearance discrimination.
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Chapter 7
The Future of Appearance Discrimination
Arguments against legislation

The biggest problem that would result from legislation banning appearance
discrimination is that it would be hard to establish and enforce. Although most members
of American society agree that certain characteristics are what make individuals more
attractive, attractiveness is still partly based on personal tastes and preferences. It is easy
to determine who is protected by other discrimination laws, such as those that protect
race and sex, but it is unclear how a court would determine who is unattractive enough to
be covered by the law. This may involve the creation of criteria for determining who is
attractive and who is unattractive. Other uncertainties include determining who would
create the criteria and how to establish that appearance was even a factor in an
employer's decision.
Another problem is the potential for over-inclusiveness. The introduction of a
law that protects physical characteristics could be interpreted to include any physical
characteristics, no matter how insignificant they may seem. In addition to attractiveness,
height, and weight, people could begin to claim that they were discriminated against
because they were "left-handed, mildly overweight, or redheaded" (Adamitis).

This

would allow for an overflow of unnecessary litigation.
Opponents of appearance discrimination legislation claim that these laws intrude
on an employer's right to make decisions about the operation of their business. In some
professions, such as sales, where attractiveness or overall appearance may be important in
generating profits, laws restricting an employer's entitlement to hire certain people may
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jeopardize the business. Also, where uniformity is essential to an employer, such as the
case of Kelley vs. Johnson, legislation has the potential of allowing employees to refuse
to follow dress code policies. This could even result in prohibiting employers from
requiring their employees to wear uniforms.
Legislation banning appearance discrimination would mean making unattractive
people a protected class. This has the potential of leading to affmnative action plans. As
far fetched and unlikely as this may seem, other forms of discrimination against protected
classes have lead to affirmative action plans. Making unattractive people a protected
class could mean that appearance discrimination has the potential to follow these other
types of discrimination in implementing affirmative action plans. Employers would be
forced to create systems that remedy the effects of discrimination based on appearance.

Arguments for legislation

Laws have been created to prevent some types of discrimination, such as
discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, and age. These laws
allow for equal opportunities and equal pay.

But when it comes to appearance,

discrimination is legal in most places in the U.S. If the federal government began to
create laws that prohibited appearance discrimination in employment, it would provide a
more even playing field for all employees and applicants. Employers would not be able
to judge your character or ability based on your clothing, body type, or overall
attractiveness. They would be forced to determine whether someone was qualified for a
job by testing their skills instead ofby their appearance.
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Victims would not be forced to tie their discrimination to another type of illegal
discrimination. Many victims have failed to get any type of compensation because they
could not relate their discrimination to an already protected class. In situations where
employees have alleged that the real reason they were fired or not hired involved
protected group status such as sex or disability, they still have the burden of proving that
the discrimination was more than just appearance-based. Legislation banning appearance
discrimination would make it easier for victims to prove that their case is valid. They
would be able to address the discrimination more directly and would likely be more
successful. Also, because employees are using Title VII, the ADA, and other laws to try
to fight back against their employers, this could potentially jeopardize the claims of those
who are actually members of a protected class. The original purpose of these laws was
not to protect against appearance discrimination and using them to do so may weaken
their intent.
Supporters of appearance discrimination legislation argue that claims of overinclusiveness and difficulty in documenting and proving appearance-based discrimination
should be dismissed because employees would still be required to follow the same
standards that are currently being used in discrimination cases.

The applicant or

employee would have to meet the requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination.
The employer would then have the opportunity to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for
firing or refusing to hire the person. The employee would then have the ultimate burden
of proving that discrimination took place. If the plaintiff cannot meet this burden, their
claim would be denied.
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Where legislation is headed

The cases that have been discussed in this paper are evidence that employers are
paying more attention to the image of their business and, even more so, their employees.
Without the establishment of laws preventing appearance discrimination, the federal
government is allowing the problem to grow.

Laws that protect applicants and

employees from other types of discrimination, such as race and sex, were created as a
result of past discrimination. Although it may not happen any time soon because of the
problems discussed earlier in this chapter, I believe that a federal law prohibiting some
aspects of appearance discrimination will eventually be created to end the discrimination
that is presently occurring in the workplace.
Just like race, sex, and national origin, height and weight are considered
involuntary characteristics. They cannot be changed as easily as clothing or hairstyle.
Yet unlike race, sex, and national origin, height and weight are not protected under
federal law. Exceptions include when height or weight is the result of a disability, when
an employer perceives an applicant's or employee's height or weight to be the result of a
disability, and when height or weight can be associated with a large population of a
protected class. In most other situations, an employer may decide to fire or refuse to hire
a person based on their height or weight. The federal government took the correct steps
to prohibit discrimination based on other involuntary characteristics such as race and sex;
height and weight should be next on their list.
This would protect employees in situations such as the one experienced by
Barbara Lamoria. Lamoria was fired after her employer was heard commenting on her
weight.

Even though her weight was not related to a disability, she won her case.
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Because she lived in Michigan, she was covered by a law that specifically prohibited
employers from discrimination based on weight.

But if Lamoria had not lived in

Michigan, her case would have been dropped. Toni Cassista, however, was denied a job
at a local food store because the employer was concerned with her weight. Because she
did not live in a state that prohibited discrimination based on weight, her case was
dropped.

The employer was permitted to discriminate against her based on a

characteristic that cannot easily be changed. A federal law prohibiting discrimination
based on height and weight would benefit applicants and employees like Cassista.
The law may also include protection from discrimination based on physical .
attractiveness. While this may be hard to establish in many cases, in some cases such as
Yanowitz v. L'Oreal, the employer may actually state that an employee is not attractive
enough. The employee in this case would be covered under this proposed law because
physical attractiveness, in many cases, cannot easily be changed. While make-up and
cosmetic surgery may be used to enhance physical attractiveness, not all people have the
access or the ability. The only exception to this law would be in businesses where
attractiveness may be considered a BFOQ. This can include businesses such as the
Playboy Clubs which were established with the main objective of selling sex appeal.
The law, however, would not prohibit employers from discriminating against
applicants and employees based on voluntary characteristics such as clothing, grooming,
and appearance in general.

Employers should still have the right to require their

employees be well dressed and groomed. This may include the creation of dress codes
and grooming standards that are reasonably necessary to the operation of the business.
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This is especially true in businesses where employees have direct interaction with
customers such as in retail stores and restaurants.
The importance of an employer's right to establish a dress code can be
demonstrated in cases like the one filed by Elisa Janetis. Janetis filed a suit against her
employer after she was criticized for wearing tight, revealing clothing to work. Her
employer believed that allowing Janetis to wear this kind of clothing left the business
open to a possible sexual harassment suit. But because she lived in a state that prohibited
discrimination based on "personal appearance" in general, J anetis won her case. The
court ruled that because employers in D.C. are prohibited from discriminating against an
employee based on personal appearance, Janetis' employer could not even require that
she wear proper business attire.
characteristics

should

not

be

This case supports the reason that voluntary
included

in

legislation

preventing

appearance

discrimination.
As discussed in Chapter 1, appearance discrimination exists as a result of several
factors including the belief that there is a correlation between attractiveness and
characteristics such as high IQ and success. But one of the strongest motives for the
existence of appearance discrimination is that there are almost no laws preventing it. By
not establishing laws that will prevent appearance discrimination, we are suggesting that
it is acceptable to make employment decisions that undeservingly eliminate certain
people from being hired. By creating a law that prohibits employers from discrimination
based on height, weight, and physical attractiveness, the federal government would be
extending protection to applicants and employees who ·do not have the ability to change
these characteristics.
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